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The gap between an ultimate goal and immediate dangers
Town’s assessment, reported by Kyodo around the twentieth anniversary of the 2006 test, highlights a central paradox. Denuclearization remains a significant nonproliferation objective, but making it the prerequisite for every diplomatic contact may prevent negotiations on urgent threats that exist now.
North Korea conducted six nuclear tests between 2006 and September 2017. Its intercontinental ballistic missile demonstrations in 2017 changed calculations because a confrontation on the peninsula could also threaten the American homeland. They intensified South Korean concerns about whether American extended deterrence would remain credible in a severe crisis.
Recognizing the current arsenal as a strategic reality does not cancel United Nations Security Council resolutions or international obligations. The question is whether interim measures could reduce the likelihood of a disastrous miscalculation without abandoning those commitments.
What the collapse of diplomacy revealed
The 2018 summit between Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un in Singapore briefly raised hopes for a different relationship and a pledge to work toward denuclearization of the peninsula. Their February 2019 Hanoi summit ended without a deal amid disagreement over nuclear concessions and sanctions relief.















