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Congress may change hands without rewriting foreign policy
The midterms put all 435 House seats and roughly a third of the Senate before voters. Republicans entered the election controlling both chambers, although their House advantage was narrow. Early Democratic victories in particular races do not establish the final nationwide outcome: counting and race calls can take longer in competitive states, especially where mailed ballots must be processed.
A Democratic House could intensify hearings, demand administration records and complicate budget negotiations. A change in the Senate would also affect confirmation of officials. But the presidency retains veto power and considerable latitude in diplomacy. It would therefore be mistaken to treat a possible congressional reversal as an automatic change of course toward Beijing.
Why bipartisan strategic competition is likely to persist
Chen Dongxiao expects Democrats, should they gain control, to focus substantially on limiting the administration’s domestic authority rather than dismantling its approach to China. His view reflects a broader trend across successive administrations: disagreements over tariffs, investment restrictions or climate cooperation have not erased shared concerns about supply chains, advanced technology and regional security.
Agreement on a strategic challenge does not imply agreement on methods. Lawmakers may insist on tighter scrutiny of sensitive technology transfers or greater disclosure of economic arrangements. The White House, meanwhile, may prefer direct bargaining to prevent sudden shocks to businesses and markets. The tension between legislative pressure and executive pragmatism could be more consequential than party labels alone.
Taiwan and trade remain the sharpest tests
Taiwan is perhaps the most sensitive issue. Beijing regards the self-governed island as part of China and has not ruled out force to achieve unification. Washington maintains unofficial relations with Taipei, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by force and has a legal framework supporting Taiwan’s self-defense. Those positions still leave room for contention over the timing and scale of military sales.
Chen warned that members of both American parties might press harder for arms transfers previously delayed. That is an analyst’s forecast, not an enacted congressional decision. Similar pressures could arise around semiconductors, artificial intelligence and export controls. Each isolated move may be manageable; a succession of poorly communicated measures could nevertheless encourage dangerous misreadings on either side.
Managing rivalry requires channels that survive elections
Beijing has good reason to monitor the new Congress, but a strategy resting solely on the current party majority would be fragile. Elections, budget disputes and investigations can rearrange Washington’s priorities. The United States, in turn, must consider economic interdependence and supply-chain disruption before accelerating restrictions that affect firms and households.
In his interview with The Paper, Chen urged strategic composure and institutional dialogue on economic affairs, artificial intelligence and military security. He argued that neither country could bear the costs of a nuclear conflict or complete economic decoupling. That is a strategic judgment, rather than a guarantee that crises cannot occur.
For companies and communities affected by bilateral tensions, the immediate concern is less campaign rhetoric than the survival of workable communications, negotiation timelines and predictable rules. Sustainable investment needs some expectation of continuity. The midterms may therefore produce short-term turbulence while the longer trajectory still depends on choices made in both Washington and Beijing.
















