A claim from the Supreme Council of Cyberspace
In remarks published by the Mehr News Agency (MNA) on Monday, October 5, Mohammad Amin Aghamiri, Secretary of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace and Head of Iran's National Cyberspace Center, said the country had been locked in a serious confrontation over cybersecurity and wider security issues since the war began. Iran, he said, had been able to manage the operation of some networks and platforms, Starlink among them, and stop them from continuing to function.
Aghamiri accused Israel of trying to exploit Starlink to sow anxiety and push Tehran toward certain decisions. Yet he also acknowledged that, given the technical realities, some of the claims surrounding these efforts were mere speculation, adding that Iranian authorities had been closely monitoring every move.
*“Iran is technically and operationally prepared to respond if new tools are used to attack the country's network or military infrastructure.” — Mohammad Amin Aghamiri*
An invisible war in low Earth orbit
Starlink relies on thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit, letting users connect directly without fibre-optic cables or mobile towers, the kind of infrastructure a state can easily control. A Reuters analysis in January described Iran as one of the toughest security tests yet for Musk's network since it was deployed during the war in Ukraine. Experts say Tehran used several layers of countermeasures:
- Jamming the GPS signals that Starlink terminals need to locate and connect to satellites.
- Broadcasting spoofed GPS signals, leaving terminals unstable and sharply slowing speeds.
- Tracking down and seizing devices while imposing heavy penalties on users and distributors.
Even so, specialists remain divided over how effective these measures really were.
Some analysts argue that Starlink's beams are so narrow and focused that direct jamming is extremely difficult, while SpaceX has repeatedly pushed software updates to help terminals adapt to hostile signal environments.
Between claims and reality
Independently verifying Aghamiri's claim is currently close to impossible. During the blackout earlier this year, Raha Bahreini, an Iran researcher at Amnesty International, said the organisation had verified dozens of videos of the crackdown and believed almost all of them came from people with access to Starlink. That suggests that, however throttled, the channel was never completely severed.
At the same time, experts caution that Starlink is no magic wand for a nation of roughly 90 million people. Terminals are estimated to number only in the tens of thousands, they are expensive, and owning one carries serious legal risk. In April, four people, including two foreigners, were arrested in northwestern Iran on charges of importing satellite internet equipment.
The cost of a disconnected nation
On May 26, after 88 days of near-total paralysis, internet access in Iran was partially restored on the instructions of President Masoud Pezeshkian. The monitoring group NetBlocks called it the longest nationwide shutdown in modern history. Shortly afterwards, the judiciary suspended the very body that had ordered the reconnection, exposing rifts within the power structure over how tightly cyberspace should be controlled after the war.
For the authorities in Tehran, neutralising Starlink is proof of the country's ability to defend itself against foreign technological interference. For millions of ordinary Iranians, however, the months without connection meant stalled work, interrupted studies and calls to loved ones under the bombs that could never be made. The Starlink story therefore reaches beyond a technical contest: it touches the fragile line between national security and the human right to know and to speak.

















