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A cautiously positive verdict in Vienna
Grossi’s comments came during a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, where the US–Saudi safeguards text was under consideration. He welcomed the provisions as a meaningful outcome for the specific cooperation under discussion, while acknowledging that the Additional Protocol provides broader access. His assessment should not be read as a declaration that all proliferation concerns have disappeared; it reflects a judgment about the inspection tools contained in this particular arrangement.
The bilateral safeguards text reviewed by Reuters allows the agency to seek short-notice access to locations on sites covered by the agreement. The reported procedure provides at least two hours’ notice when inspectors are already present at a covered site, or at least 24 hours otherwise. Such timelines can help inspectors verify declared activities rapidly, but the geographic limit is important: covered sites are not the same as every possible undeclared location in the country.
Why the Additional Protocol remains central
Saudi Arabia has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, the foundation for verifying nuclear material in its declared peaceful programme. The Additional Protocol goes further by broadening required declarations and providing tools for investigating questions about undeclared nuclear material and activities.
















