MAIN REPORT
The 60% threshold and the demand for concrete action
In his Reuters interview in Alaska, JD Vance argued that Washington will not accept broad assurances as a substitute for measurable change. If Iran wants to demonstrate that it is not seeking a nuclear weapon, he said, Tehran must alter its enrichment capacity in a way that can be observed and verified. Vance singled out enrichment to 60% because it stands far above levels normally associated with civilian nuclear power and has become a shorthand for the gulf between the two sides.
His position reflects a longstanding problem in the Iran nuclear file: an agreement matters only if technical limits, reliable data and sufficient verification make compliance visible. IAEA reporting before the current war documented Iranian production and stockpiling of uranium enriched to 60% U-235 alongside expanded centrifuge capacity. After strikes on nuclear facilities and interruptions to inspections, designing a credible verification system for any new accord has become even more difficult.
“We’re not going to trade words for actions.” — JD Vance

















